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Internal security and the fight against terrorism in Germany 
 
Nearly periodically the topic of internal security appears on the public agenda of the Federal Re-
public. Election Campaigns are held and elections have been won with the promise of more security 
[cp. 30, p. 13; 33, p. 10; 21]. The subjective feeling of a lack of security in different dimensions of 
life is omnipresent. The latest security- and monitoring-acts interfere deeply – and at the same time 
nearly unnoticed – with the daily life of every single citizen. The debate on crime and internal secu-
rity is dominated by very emotional and ideological-normative arguments [cp. 18, p. 151]. Objec-
tive arguments and evaluations of proportionality are hard to find. 
I. The German understanding of “Internal security” and its his-
torical roots 
The term “Innere Sicherheit” – internal security – appeared for the first time in the 1960s. From 
then onwards it has always played an important role in political discussions. Since 1969 the Federal 
Ministry of the interior periodically published a report on „Innere Sicherheit“ (for the last time in 
1994). Since then the term has been established in the political and administrational language. In 
1972 the policy of internal security became the quasi status of law by the introduction of the 
“Schwerpunktprogramm Innere Sicherheit” (programme of emphasis internal security) [25, p. 16]. 
However, what is covered by the term internal security and what it has to guarantee for has not been 
precisely defined yet in legal terms. In the first instance the term is used in a penologic context. It 
describes a preventive aim of the legislator. The measures under internal security are aimed to pre-
vent crime in all possible fields of society. Therefore, from a traditional national state centred point 
of view internal security is seen as another element of national security, beside foreign security. 
This traditional distinction between internal security and foreign security had an impact on the insti-
                                                 
1 All Citations were translated by the author of this text and were originally in German (except 32). 
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tutional organisation of the security agencies of Germany until today. By the way, the term “public 
security”, which is ensured by Article 13 of the Basic Law (also Article 35, 73 Basic Law) would 
be more precise. However, in the political and scientific use of language the term “internal security” 
has been established. 
At the same time the main focus in the policy field of “internal security” has changed several times. 
However, the ways of solution as intended by politicians remained the same. Landmark events for 
this development are certainly the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics2 in 1972, the 
German Autumn 1977, as well as the German reunification 1989/1990. By the end of the East-
West-Conflict – as an important determinant of security- and defence-political strategy [cp. 13, p. 
16] – the new, re-unified Germany became a central state in a Europe, which is continuously grow-
ing closer. And since the opening of the (Eastern-) borders it has been – at least the impression, 
which is successfully communicated by the majority of the opinion leaders in politics, in the media 
and in society – increasingly exposed to organised crime and terrorism. Although the knowledge of 
the real spread of organised crime is very vague in the Federal Republic [cp. 15, p. 21; 34, p. 51], 
the framework for politicians and the security agencies has changed dramatically. Especially for the 
security agencies the question of new fields of activity is closely linked to the institutional right to 
exist. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s the main focus of the German “security-producers” was on the fight 
against the primarily domestically motivated leftwing-terrorism of the Red Army Fraction (RAF: 
Rote Armee Fraktion), Movement 2. June (Bewegung 2. Juni) and the Revolutionary Cells (Revolu-
tionäre Zellen). The central measures used here were the so-called “Kontaktsperregesetz” – the con-
tact ban act, as well as three anti-terrorism-acts (Anti-Terror-Gesetze), “which criminalised the for-
mation of terrorist organisations, widened the powers of the prosecution authorities, and restricted 
the rights of the defence” [32, pp. 313-314]. These acts were very controversial, politically as well 
as legally. However, in August 1978 the Federal Constitutional Court approved the compatibility of 
the acts with the Basic Law (BVerfGE 49, 24 et seq.). 
In the mid 1980s the emphasis of security policy shifted towards the so-called organised crime –
“organisierte Kriminalität” [cp. 11, p. 433]. Temporarily it concentrated on extreme right neo-Nazi 
extremist movements and since about 2000, it has concentrated on the fight against (now interna-
tional) terrorism again. Thereby 9/11 does not show a redirection of security-political considera-
tions, but it rather is crucial for the enforceability of aggravated supervision- and prosecution-
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measures. Many measures which were initially aimed against organized crime are by now used 
against international terrorism. 
It successfully worked out for the relevant actors strategically to expound the problems of internal 
security over and over again. Especially recently investigating agencies and the federal prosecutors 
rely on spectacular prevention [cp. 27]. In public awareness the threat of security is seen as an im-
portant social problem of today [cp. 30, p. 9]. And in the political-social debate a non-existing but 
pretended “basic right of security” has been established. Security became a basic requirement of 
society. 
Thereby the political conflict is always focused on the contradiction between security and freedom. 
Recently the animadversion on an almighty state arose, especially in jurisprudence, but also in po-
litical science and in the media, as an arena of public discourse. The main argument is that the state 
not only manifests its claim of exercising the monopoly of force, but also tries – by an increasingly 
connected security-network – to work towards an at least partial combination of police, intelligence 
and military. The performance of the “fight against terror” already seems to affect the chance of a 
fair court proceeding negatively – the German constitutional state becomes jeopardised [cp. 22, p. 
38]. 
 
II. Actors of the policy of “internal security” 
As already suggested we can find many “security-producers” in the federal system of Germany. The 
central legislative competence is located at the federal level. That means that relevant definitions 
and penalty options are carried out by federal legislation. Other provisions can be found in Euro-
pean legislation. 
On the federal level the Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for anti-terrorism activities. 
This includes the work of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protec-
tion of the Constitution, legislation relating to foreigners, i.e. asylum, visa and immigration policy, 
and border control. The principles for airport security checks of passengers and baggage are devel-
oped within the Federal Ministry of the Interior and carried out by the Federal Border Police. Civil 
protection and disaster management policy also falls within the responsibility of the Federal Minis-
ter of the Interior. 
However, all in all there are 37 federal and regional authorities involved in averting danger and the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism. The federal system of Germany causes, that the compe-
tences are vertically divided between the federation and the states, which is complemented by an 
additional horizontal differentiation of competences: the Federal Criminal Police Office, 16 State 
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Criminal Police Offices, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 16 State Offices for 
the Protection of the Constitution, the Federal Border Police, the Office for investigation of toll 
crimes, the Federal Intelligence Service and the Military Screening Service work side by side, to-
gether and against each other to ensure internal security. The professional supervision and the po-
litical accountability is located at the different ministries. Because of historical experiences internal 
and foreign security are in the same way officially separated, which applies to tasks of the police 
and the intelligence. 
Since the foundation of the Federal Republic the competences of the police and security authorities 
have been enlarged continuously. Only Constitutional Court curbed the steady expansion of the 
scope of the state with different judgments. 
Because of massive criticism in recent times the security architecture, as it was constituted in the 
1950s, seems to change dramatically after decades of stability. 
 
III. Measures of national security policy 
Since the 1990s it has been possible to notice a change of policy in other European states towards 
prevention. [cp. 8, p. 182; 32, p. 361]. At the same time the most important instrument of securing 
freedom – the principle of proportionality – has become increasingly suspended by this kind of pol-
icy [cp. 19]. Actually the increasing legislative action since the beginning of the 1990s in the field 
of domestic and legal policy has reduced central basic rights – as they are guaranteed in Article 20 
Basic Law (rule of law) in connection with Article 79 (eternity clause) – with the aim to reach air-
tight solutions in the field of internal security [cp. 20]. Again and again the Constitutional Court 
had to correct the legislator. Later rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality 
of parts of legislation point out the partly missing consideration of the free basic order of the Basic 
Law by the legislator [cp. 3]. 
The public discussion has been mostly reduced to nation state centred aspects and logics of action: 
Up to then, only well known claims for new and even more far reaching intervention competences 
have been demanded to prevent and to fight against dangers. New approaches for the combat of the 
“new” threat3 are still missing. Also a European perspective did not play an important role in a per-
ception and discussion level recently. The assaults in the USA in September 2001 just accelerated 
this general development [cp. 23, p. 77; 14; 35]: Since then internal security has been the permanent 
                                                 
3 In this context “new” means primarily the ideological justification and respectively the motivation of 
terrorist offences. In the categories of organisation sociology, as Mayntz [29] describes, the organisation 
specific differences between “old” and “new” terrorism are contrary to the popular posits less selective to 
prove.    
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dominating topic and the justification basis of many massive changes of legislation. “The terrorist 
threat“, citing Hoffmann-Riem [24], “leads the state into temptation, to do now what it has always 
wanted to do, but was not allowed to do until now due to constitutional reasons.”4 It seems that the 
government and the legislator meanwhile took the bait to a large extent.5 Last but not least that can 
be seen in the suspected unconstitutionality of some legislation in this field. Actually the Constitu-
tional Court has already ruled against some of the bills. [cp. e.g. 32, p. 361]. 
For the analysis of security policy the change of government in 1998 is a landmark – however, 
against one’s expectations no turning point. Normally one would assume that a centre-left govern-
ment in the field of internal security would carry on a more liberal orientated policy – however, the 
opposite is the case in this policy field. Thereby security policy was not the prior aim of the red-
green government under chancellor Schröder [cp. 10, p 305f.]. The red-green coalition treaty of 
1998 for example did not contain any relevant suggestions of a European cooperation in judicial 
and domestic affairs. In the field of organised crime and the fight against terrorism was no urgent 
call for action. The essential intervention competences and requests of preliminary proceedings of 
the security authorities were already introduced before 1998 with a general cross-party and cross-
government majority, but without the support of the Green Party. After 1998 further measures were 
not politically enforceable – especially not with the left-liberal coalition partner, Alliance 90 / The 
Greens. Therefore in the sphere of domestic and legal policy rather small – although absolutely im-
portant – international cooperation agreements were worked out, which were aimed to improve the 
increasing networking of the daily business on the European and international level. Furthermore 
the intrastate cooperation of the prosecution and enquiry authorities was developed. 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11 the situation changes dramatically 
for the German government, too, because three out of four Arab highjackers had been living in 
Hamburg and had presumably been involved in the planning of the attacks.6 The Federal Minister 
of the Interior had been hoping for a more restrictive policy for some time - now the attacks helped 
him to succeed with his plans. At the same time, however, some steps in the catalogue of actions as 
planned by the EU from September 21, 2001 were deliberately postponed, because they would have 
                                                 
4 „Die terroristische Bedrohung führt den Staat in Versuchung, jetzt das zu tun, was er schon immer tun 
wollte, aber aus rechtsstaatlichen Gründen bisher nicht tun durfte.“ 
5 Even by the selling of the tickets for the football world cup 2006 – actually a state distanced space 
under private law –on demand of the organisation committees and the security authorities broad 
personal data have been collected. Despite massive critique of the data protection officers of the 
Federation and the Länder [cp. 12] data like date of birth and identity card numbers have been collected, 
recorded and forwarded. But also in other, complete different areas for example life is keen charged up 
against life: in the air-security act only the Federal President clearly expressed constitutional concerns 
[cp. 17]. 
6 Thereby it becomes apparent in the still open criminal procedure against the possible accomplices that 
the criminal prosecution does not fail because of the German Law, but rather by the insufficient 
cooperation of the US-American security authorities [cp. 16].  
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affected national sovereignty, e.g. the decision on the implementation of the European arrest war-
rant, determined by the Council of the EU on June 13, 2002 [Rahmenbeschluss 2002/584/JI, see 1]. 
In June 2004 the German Bundestag took a personal vote on the acceptance of this law [31], which 
still awaits confirmation from the Constitutional Court. 
As a reaction to September 11 two so-called “safety packets” were passed with great majority (from 
all parties), in quick succession after only short discussions in Parliament. I will give a quick survey 
of the most important results of these laws [for greater detail see 32]. 
Already on September 19th, 2001, only eight days after the terrible attacks, the German government 
agreed on a new set of emergency measures, known as the first security package.  
The first packet contained mainly repressive steps and was supplemented by the law concerning the 
funding of operations against terror, which enabled the German government to spent another 1.5 
billion Euro on the fight against terrorism in 2002. In 2002 fully 60% (2.1 billion Euro) of the total 
budget of the Federal Ministry of the Interior went toward domestic security. The very short span of 
time between the attacks and the presentation of the bill show that no new ideas were being pub-
lished- the time had suddenly become ripe for an old idea. 
The main issue in the so-called first security packet of November 2001 was the abolition of the 
privilege of religion7, planned as early as January 2001. Membership in a foreign terrorist group 
became illegal (§ 129b StGB: „Kriminelle und terroristische Vereinigungen im Ausland“). With 
this decision the Bundestag went further than the EU in general and enabled the authorities to chase 
down potential criminals in Germany, if they were members of unspecified criminal groups outside 
Germany. After lengthy discussions between the coalition parties the Bundestag passed the law 
with a majority of the coalition in late April 2002. A compromise had only been possible after the 
Al-Quaida- attack on Djerba from April 11, 2004, where 14 Germans died. 
Further changes are stricter action against money laundering, introduction of biometric identity 
cards, massive expansion of bugging, preventive as well as repressive, and the virtual abolition of 
banking secrecy as from April 2005. No evidence or proof of criminal actions are needed anymore 
for these steps to be taken [cp. 9]. And the person against whom the bugging (or other steps) is di-
rected does not have to be informed of the procedure after this is finished. 
The second, comprehensive package of anti-terrorism legislation went into effect on January 1st, 
2002, introducing a number of amendments that have significantly improved the efforts of security 
authorities to combat international terrorism, as the Federal Ministry of the Interior says. This sec-
ond security packet contains preventive laws and changes of laws mainly. Here the government re-
                                                 
7 “Privilege of religion” describes the position of denominations and similar groups, which do not have to 
follow the common law for groups and congregations. 
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ferred to the international situation and community, especially UN-resolution 1373 [cp. 21, pp. 147-
151]. 
Thus Germany follows in the footsteps of other nations and tightens its laws and regulations- per-
haps not as much as other states, but nevertheless quite considerably. 
It is to be noted, that laws which are relevant for security have been and still are passed with great 
majority in Germany. Only a few issues which are of high symbolic value are controversial, such as 
the question of deployment of the army in security matters in Germany itself which has been illegal 
so far. The war against organised crime, foreign crime, juvenile delinquency, violence, petty crime, 
white-collar crime and last but not least terror is waged in the name of home security. [cp. 8, p. 
194]. Especially in the fight against terror preventive methods have taken the place of repression. 
It is particularly remarkable, that this change in strategy towards a stricter surveillance has taken 
place before September 11. The attacks only made the implantation of these ideas possible8 and 
then a long chain of reactions in the media and in politics followed [cp. 4, p. 26]. 
A government which called itself left-wing thus made stricter and more radical cuts in the net of 
civil freedoms and at a time when there was little threat and danger for the system than the right-
wing government did in the 70s, when there was a real threat from left-wing terrorists. And all this 
at a time, when it turned out that a planned attack on the Christmas Fair in Strasbourg could be suc-
cessfully prevented by existing means and laws. 
The most important change of policy of the red-green German government, however, can be seen in 
foreign politics. The fight against terrorism does no longer stop at the borders; it is no longer a na-
tional issue. Social democrat Struck, Minister of Defence, maintains that “the safety of Germany is 
defended as far away as the Hindukusch”. In this way the German government follows suit to a de-
cision made by NATO in 1999. The German army is being transformed into a unit that can be de-
ployed worldwide, given a UN or NATO mandate. This fundamental change, however, is not being 
discussed in public any more. The German government also makes no mention of soldiers killed in 
action while abroad. 
 
 
                                                 
8 One can confidently assume that real threats against Germany have decreased. The planned attack in 
Strasbourg and the attacks from Madrid on March 3, 2004 prove as much. Attacks, however, are possible 
in Germany, too; statements from the suspects in Düsseldorf Al-Tawhid-case show as much. (see 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de; Die Zeit 49/2003). The commensurability of measures, however, is not always 
granted; Federal and State Ministers and even the Ministries of the Interior show a tendency towards 
exaggeration.  
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IV. Evaluation of the security packets 
Due to an intervention from the Greens, partners in the coalition, the main regulations in the two 
packets are limited to a duration of five years. Article 22, paragraph 2 and 3 state this. (Bundesge-
setzblatt Jahrgang 2002 Teil I Nr. 3: 395)  
The evaluation was presented in May 2005. Strangely enough, those who were to be evaluated or-
ganised the evaluation themselves. The Federal Office for the Interior itself is responsible for the 
evaluation process, even though the minister, Otto Schily, was the one to initiate and press forward 
the stricter regulations. Therefore the evaluation, which was made public in parts only, has to be 
regarded with great caution, critics of Schily’s position maintain. And it does not come as a surprise 
that the Home Office approves of the effects of the security packets and demands the limitation in 
duration to be repealed. 
Looking at the situation more closely one will notice that not much use has been made of the new 
surveillance possibilities. During 2002 - 2004, only 99 cases of inquiries (mainly bank affairs or 
telecommunication surveillance) were carried out, 134 persons were registered as being under sur-
veillance. In consequence of the new surveillance mission (§ 3 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 BVerfSchG, § 1 Abs. 1 
Satz 2 MADG), six islamic organisations were controlled by the Federal Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution and the Military Defence Service (MAD). The “charity” “Al Aqsa e.V.” was de-
clared illegal on August 5, 2002 by the Federal Ministry; in addition to that the anti-Jewish Hizb ut-
Tahrir was forbidden on January 15, 2003. 
Also a possible attack on Iraqui Prime Minister Allawi is said to have been discovered and pre-
vented; two people who were members of “Ansar al Islam” and who were suspected of planning 
suicide attacks, were detected by the security checks which were made possible in greater detail by 
Art 5 “ Law concerning the fight against terror” [cp. 5; 6]. Priority was given to security checks in 
military fields; here 12000 checks were carried out, that is 80% of the total. A real threat to security 
was only posed in a very small number of cases. 
Both security packets primarily provide new knowledge; prevention of real and planned crime 
comes as a side effect. Federal Minister Schily claims that “declaring institutions and certain prac-
tices illegal has proved to prevent crime successfully” [cp. 7]. 
Yet, it is difficult to really prove how successful the new laws are, because a lot of evidence is kept 
secret. One may assume that little real threat was posed. No trials, arrests or convictions became 
known, the same results may have been obtained with the old (less restrictive) procedures. It is not 
clear yet, if the Federal Minister of the Interior can find a majority for his idea of unlimited duration 
of the security packets. At the moment representatives of both Social Democrats and the Greens fa-
vour another limited period of 3 - 5 years. 
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V. Further prospects 
The Federal Ministry of the Interior demands a third security packet, even though there might be 
General Elections and a change in government in autumn 2005. A first reading is to be held in the 
Bundestag before the summer break. ”Better preventive competence of the Federal Criminal Police 
Office (BKA), new data bases for the fight against terrorism, and the improvement of communica-
tion and co-operation between security forces are the main issues” [cp. 28]. 
A bone of contention will probably be the expansion of data storage and the additional power to be 
given to the Federal Criminal Police Office. Especially the first point meets with string disapproval, 
based on constitutional rights. There is no doubt, however, that there will be no dramatic change in 
the basic strategies of the fight against terrorism. Core elements of security are the expansion of 
prevention and surveillance, supported by a massive effort to achieve a European network of secu-
rity and data exchange. Since September 2001 the European aspect of the matter has been increas-
ingly noticed and used by the politicians to give more weight to their bills. The reason for this is the 
growing criticism of parts of the German public: they doubt the necessity of the new laws and criti-
cise openly. Referring to the European Union makes the situation for German politicians easier. All 
in all, in the course of the past few years Germany has changed dramatically from a liberal constitu-
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